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9(B) OR NOT 9(B)? THAT IS THE QUESTION:
HOW TO PLEAD NEGLIGENT
MISREPRESENTATION IN
THE POST-TWOMBLY ERA
Andrew Todres*
Perhaps nothing is more important to a litigant bringing an action in
federal court than knowing the relevant pleading standard for his or her
underlying claims. Ever since the inception of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, one of two pleading standards have applied to common law
claims: the Rule 8(a)(2) standard, requiring a short and plain statement
demonstrating entitlement to relief, or the Rule 9(b) standard, demanding
that allegations of fraud or mistake be pled with particularity. At the
intersection of these two pleading standards is the common law claim of
negligent misrepresentation.
Courts across the country have long
disagreed over which standard should apply to negligent misrepresentation
claims, with divisions present across and within circuits and districts.
In 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court further complicated this issue in the
seminal opinion Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, which effectively imposed
a heightened “plausibility” requirement for claims governed by Rule
8(a)(2). This change has since led some lower courts, but not all, to
reconsider which pleading standard to apply to claims of negligent
misrepresentation.
This Note: (1) explores the pleading standards and their evolution with
respect to negligent misrepresentation claims; (2) describes the circuit split
and intracircuit fractures that have emerged from the different standards;
(3) analyzes the significant procedural and substantive problems the
competing standards have created, especially in light of Twombly; and
(4) offers a possible resolution comporting with the Twombly holding to
standardize the pleading of negligent misrepresentation claims across the
nation’s federal courts.

* J.D. Candidate, 2014, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2009, University of
Pennsylvania. I am forever grateful to Professor Marc Arkin, whose invaluable guidance
and steadfast commitment to this project made the daunting process of writing a Note on a
quirky civil procedure issue rather enjoyable. Finally, I would like to thank my family and
friends for their constant support.
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INTRODUCTION
On March 29, 2012, Terrence Hood’s life took a dramatic turn for the
worse.1 Hood was flung from his motorcycle during an accident and rushed
to Denver Health Medical Center, which he would call home for the next
three months.2 Having sustained life-threatening injuries, Hood underwent
numerous surgeries and procedures until his discharge in June.3 The cost of
his treatment totaled approximately $750,000.4
Hood reasonably believed that the cost would be covered under his health
plan. His domestic partner, Junnapa Intarakamhang, was a full-time, active
employee of defendant Beverage Distributors Co. (Beverage Distributors),
and a member of its employee health plan.5 She and Hood had submitted
an application for domestic partner coverage for Hood under the plan nearly
a year before the accident.6 Accordingly, during the first two months of
Hood’s hospital stay, the claims administrator, defendant Principal Life
Insurance Co. (Principal), repeatedly preauthorized additional days for
Hood to stay at the hospital.7 These authorizations prompted the hospital to
continue to care for Hood without interruption, and they assured the
hospital that it did not need to seek alternate funding from a third party.8
As far as the hospital, Hood, and Intarakamhang were concerned, Hood was
adequately covered by insurance.
Beverage Distributors had other ideas. On May 14, 2009, nearly two
months into Hood’s treatments, the company informed Intarakamhang that
coverage for Hood under the health plan had been rescinded because he had
been married to another woman when he enrolled in the plan as her
domestic partner.9 This allegation left plaintiff Denver Health and Hospital
Authority, to which the claims had been assigned, with responsibility for
the medical bills, having never sought alternative payment arrangements
through Medicare or a third party because of Principal’s representations.10
Denver Health and Hospital Authority sued Beverage Distributors and
Principal in Colorado federal court, claiming, inter alia, negligent
misrepresentation based on their failure to use reasonable care or
competence in obtaining and communicating information concerning
Hood’s eligibility for benefits under the plan.11 Beverage Distributors and
Principal moved to dismiss, claiming that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
9(b) applied to the negligent misrepresentation claim, a heightened standard

1. See generally Denver Health & Hosp. Auth. v. Beverage Distribs. Co., 843 F. Supp.
2d 1171 (D. Colo. 2012).
2. Id. at 1174–75.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 1175.
5. Id. at 1174.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 1175.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See id. at 1175–78 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)).
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that the plaintiff failed to meet.12 They contended that Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 8(a) did not govern the negligent misrepresentation claim.13
In response, the court held that Rule 8(a) applied, noting that “the crux of
the claim [was] that Beverage [Distributors] failed to use reasonable care or
competence in obtaining and communicating information concerning
Hood’s eligibility. This rings not of fraud but negligence.”14
So, which pleading standard should apply in cases of negligent
misrepresentation? Although courts cannot agree on a resolution, one thing
is quite apparent: in this case and in others, the answer can be a matter of
life or death for a civil claim.
First, this Note explores both standards and their evolution with respect
to negligent misrepresentation claims, and the circuit split and intracircuit
fractures that have resulted from the differing standards. Next, it identifies
significant procedural and substantive problems that arise from the murky
standards and varying requirements, especially in light of the recent seminal
U.S. Supreme Court pleading standard cases, Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly15 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal.16 Finally, this Note offers a possible
resolution comporting with those cases to standardize the pleading of
negligent misrepresentation claims.
I. THE DIFFICULTY WITH PLEADING NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION: AN
OVERVIEW OF NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION CLAIMS AND THE
EVOLUTION OF FEDERAL PLEADING STANDARDS
Part I of this Note details negligent misrepresentation claims generally
and discusses the corresponding federal pleading standards. Part I.A
introduces the tort of negligent misrepresentation, describing its origins and
elements, showing how it is distinct from, but often confused with, fraud,
exploring state law variations in the tort, and tracking differing policy
approaches to applying negligent misrepresentation law.17 Part I.B then
turns to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, providing a brief primer on
the Rules and the reasons for their creation, and analyzing the evolution of
Rule 8, the general pleading standard.18 Part I.C takes a look at Rule 9, the
pleading standard requiring particularity, and traces its development
alongside Rule 8.19 Part I.D then examines two recent, leading U.S.
Supreme Court cases that effectively heightened the bar for pleading under
Rule 8 and the various policy issues and difficulties that courts have faced
in light of the current, enhanced pleading standard.20

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id. at 1177.
Id.
Id.
550 U.S. 544 (2007).
556 U.S. 662 (2009).
See infra Part I.A.
See infra Part I.B.
See infra Part I.C.
See infra Part I.D.
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A. The Claim of Negligent Misrepresentation
Negligent misrepresentation is a common tort claim, yet, in federal court,
the law behind it is applied inconsistently, confused with fraud, and
overlooked by courts and practitioners alike.21 This section explains the
complexities of the claim and provide a foundation for the problems that
arise in pleading it in the federal courts. Part I.A.1 gives a broad overview
of the claim and describes the general elements of it.22 Part I.A.2 traces
some of the early scholarship regarding negligent misrepresentation
claims.23 Part I.A.3 more thoroughly introduces some courts’ and
practitioners’ confusion over negligent misrepresentation claims, especially
given their similarity to fraudulent misrepresentation claims.24 Part I.A.4
examines different policy views on the claim of negligent misrepresentation
and how those differences lead certain states to apply the law differently.25
Finally, Part I.A.5 explores more technical, law-based reasons driving the
state law variations in negligent misrepresentation claims.26
1. What Is Negligent Misrepresentation?
The law of negligent misrepresentation has, to a large degree, evolved
with the law of negligence.27 The first Restatement of Torts tended to focus
on negligent misrepresentation in the context of physical bodily harm.28 It
did contain one single section, section 552, regarding the negligent
communication of information causing an economic loss, entitled
“Information Negligently Supplied for the Guidance of Others,”29 which
created liability for those negligently supplying information in the course of
business.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts adopted a slightly different version of
section 552, essentially allowing for a broader class of potential plaintiffs
by adding language that supported liability for a party who supplies
information not only in the course of business, but also “in any other
transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest.”30 This “pecuniary
interest” addition was significant because it clarified that the information
negligently supplied need not be in connection with the party’s own
business or profession.31

21. See generally Robert K. Wise & Heather E. Poole, Negligent Misrepresentation in
Texas: The Misunderstood Tort, 40 TEX. TECH L. REV. 845, 846 (2008).
22. See infra Part I.A.1.
23. See infra Part I.A.2.
24. See infra Part I.A.3.
25. See infra Part I.A.4.
26. See infra Part I.A.5.
27. See generally Seth E. Lipner & Lisa A. Catalano, The Tort of Giving Negligent
Investment Advice, 39 U. MEM. L. REV. 663, 669–70 (2009).
28. See id. at 677–78. This focus reflected an emphasis on the then-burgeoning
development of products liability law and negligence. See id. at 670.
29. Id. at 677–78.
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977).
31. See Lipner & Catalano, supra note 27, at 682.
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It is also worth noting that the official comment to section 552 in the
Restatement (Second) stressed that the law “applies not only to information
given as to the existence of facts but also to an opinion given upon facts
equally well known to both the supplier and the recipient.”32 Thus, it is
possible that even a negligently given opinion can form the basis of a cause
of action.33
The duty under the Restatement to “exercise reasonable care or
competence in obtaining or communicating the information”34 is not
necessarily fixed and can change depending on the circumstances.35 The
factors that courts consider range from the character of the informant to the
sophistication of the person receiving the supplied information.36 It is
possible for a party to be liable for negligent misrepresentation even when
the person making the statement is not aware that it is untrue.37 The
hallmark of negligent misrepresentation is precisely that it does not require
an intent to defraud, or scienter.38
In addition to sophistication, the experience of the person receiving
information can also affect the liability of the informant in the context of
reliance: where the potential plaintiff has significant experience in the area
in which he is relying on the potential defendant, his chance of succeeding
on a negligent misrepresentation claim might be diminished.39
Finally, in certain circumstances, as the Restatement (Second) highlights,
a party can be liable for negligent misrepresentation if he has a duty to
disclose information, and fails to do so.40 However, given the reliance
element, an omission alone is not actionable—the plaintiff must have
justifiably relied on the omission underlying the misrepresentation claim.41
The overwhelming majority of state courts have adopted, in one form or
another, the approach in section 552 of the Restatement (Second).42
2. Early Scholarship Regarding Negligent Misrepresentation
and Development Thereof
Given the contours of the claim, determining liability for negligent
misrepresentation invariably requires fact-intensive inquiries made on a
case-by-case basis. Such inquiries must uncover the extent and justifiability
of a potential plaintiff’s reliance on those representations, as well the
32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 cmt. b.
33. Lipner & Catalano, supra note 27, at 690–91.
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552.
35. See Lipner & Catalano, supra note 27, at 692–93.
36. See id. at 693.
37. See, e.g., Galloway v. Afco Dev. Corp., 777 P.2d 506, 509 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
38. See id. (collecting cases).
39. See Lipner & Catalano, supra note 27, at 695.
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977); see also Moore v. Smith, 158 P.3d
562, 573 n.12 (Utah Ct. App. 2007).
41. See Ross v. Kirner, 172 P.3d 701, 704 (Wash. 2007) (“An omission alone cannot
constitute negligent misrepresentation, since the plaintiff must justifiably rely on a
misrepresentation.”).
42. See Lipner & Catalano, supra note 27, at 680.
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appropriateness of a potential defendant’s and potential plaintiff’s due
diligence under the circumstances.43 Courts have traditionally approached
claims for negligent misrepresentation with caution.44
At the heart of these inquiries are the reasonable expectations, or lack
thereof, of the potential plaintiff acting on the guidance received.45 As
Fowler V. Harper and Mary Coate McNeely astutely noted in an article
observing early trends and policy concerns surrounding negligent
misrepresentation claims, “[t]he propriety of the plaintiff’s expectation
involves the business ethics and mores and those general canons of fairness
and decency which affect that standard of judgment which, for want of a
better name, we call common sense.”46 Scholars and courts from the outset
also grappled with the fine-tuned distinction between honesty and deceit in
the context of negligent misrepresentation claims.47
Historically, in order to be liable for a misrepresentation tort, some sort
of scienter or blatant dishonesty was required.48 In a leading English case,
Palsey v. Freeman,49 the court wrote that the defendant misrepresentor
would not be liable for damages unless it could be proven that he was a
liar.50
But over time, U.S. courts, still using English law as a guide, started
departing from traditional notions of dishonesty as a necessary condition for
actionable misrepresentation claims.51 American courts began to recognize
words as “acts,” as opposed to “mere words,”52 which can form the basis
for actionable wrongs, even when not obviously malintentioned.53 In
essence, people could now be held accountable for carelessly spoken words
that injure others in the same way that they could be held accountable for
carelessly dropping a sack of flour onto someone and injuring him. For
instance, the famous opinion of Justice Benjamin Cardozo in Ultramares
Corp. v. Touche54 concluded that defendants could not escape liability for

43. See generally Fowler V. Harper & Mary Coate McNeely, A Synthesis of the Law of
Misrepresentation, 22 MINN. L. REV. 939 (1938).
44. See id. at 941 (“Legal liability is normally imposed only when the interests of one
party are so invaded that good social engineering requires governmental protection.”).
45. See id. at 941–42.
46. See id. at 942.
47. See W. Page Keeton, Actionable Misrepresentation: Legal Fault As a Requirement
I. Some General Observations, 1 OKLA. L. REV. 21, 23–25 (1948); see also Harper &
McNeely, supra note 43, at 959.
48. See Keeton, supra note 47, at 24.
49. (1789) 100 Eng. Rep. 450 (K.B.).
50. See Keeton, supra note 47, at 24.
51. See id. at 25–27.
52. Jeremiah Smith, Liability for Negligent Language, 14 HARV. L. REV. 184, 189–90
(1901).
53. See id. at 190. In this chestnut of an article, Jeremiah Smith proved to be at the
forefront of the law of negligence before the topic had started to garner the widespread
attention of the courts that it would ultimately receive. “It is undeniable that the making of
erroneous statements without reasonable grounds is liable under some circumstances to
cause damage. . . . Why not then impose in certain cases a duty to use reasonable care to
refrain from making erroneous statements?” Id.
54. 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931).
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misrepresentation merely because they believed their statements to be
true.55
The impetus for this shift in the law seems related to the question of
justifiable reliance and parties’ expectations. As case law developed at the
turn of the twentieth century, courts established a general presumption that
parties to a transaction may normally expect honesty from each other.56 As
such, the cause of action of negligent misrepresentation allowed plaintiffs to
hold accountable defendants who, despite honest behavior, were still
negligent in communicating material information.57
Further, when likening negligent misrepresentation to legal principles of
warranty and estoppel, courts and scholars started to recognize that the old
In considering the entire body of
English rule was illogical.58
misrepresentation law as it developed in American courts, a rule
exonerating defendants who made an honest but false statement that
induced a plaintiff to act to his detriment simply did not make sense in light
of the principle of warranty law, which established legal liability for honest
and morally innocent acts causing injury or damage.59 Further, such a rule
would be unjust to potential plaintiffs.60
3. Negligent Misrepresentation Versus Fraudulent Misrepresentation:
Examining the Similarities and Differences and the Inconsistent
Treatment by Courts
As misrepresentation law developed alongside negligence law, courts
were faced with a lingering issue: how should negligent misrepresentation
be treated in comparison to fraudulent misrepresentation?61
As a purely legal matter, there must be some difference between
negligent misrepresentation and fraudulent misrepresentation; otherwise,
the former cause of action would not exist. To this end, the official
comment to section 552 of the Restatement draws a distinction between
negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation by placing the latter more
squarely in the category of deceit.62

55. See Keeton, supra note 47, at 26.
56. Harper & McNeely, supra note 43, at 959.
57. See Keeton, supra note 47, at 29.
58. See Samuel Williston, Liability for Honest Misrepresentation, 24 HARV. L. REV.
415, 434 (1911).
59. See id. at 435.
60. See id. (“However honest his state of mind, he has induced another to act, and
damage has been thereby caused. If it be added that the plaintiff had just reason to attribute
to the defendant accurate knowledge of what he was talking about, and the statement related
to a matter of business in regard to which action was to be expected, every moral reason
exists for holding the defendant liable.”).
61. This question is especially significant because it would come to inform the debate
over which federal pleading standard should apply to negligent misrepresentation claims.
For more discussion on this issue, see infra Part II.
62. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 cmt. a (1977) (“The liability stated in this
Section is likewise more restricted than that for fraudulent misrepresentation stated in § 531.
When there is no intent to deceive but only good faith coupled with negligence, the fault of
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Even the early foundations of American misrepresentation law have
As Jeremiah Smith noted,
recognized this important difference.63
“‘Negligence is not the same as fraud.’ An action of deceit based on fraud
cannot be supported by proof of negligent misrepresentation.”64 In
addition, conflating the causes of action raises the potential problem of
overlooking or disregarding the intentional or unintentional nature of a
given misrepresentation.65
To address this issue, courts frequently distinguish fraudulent
misrepresentation by requiring scienter—that is, that a defendant have
actual knowledge or a belief that his representation is not true.66 Put
differently, negligent misrepresentation can be classified as “fraud minus
the purpose.”67 The Restatement elements of fraudulent misrepresentation
are thus essentially the same as negligent misrepresentation, save for the
scienter difference:
A misrepresentation is fraudulent if the maker
(a) knows or believes that the matter is not as he represents it to be,
(b) does not have the confidence in the accuracy of his representation
that he states or implies, or
(c) knows that he does not have the basis for his representation that he
states or implies.68

Still, for a representation “to be fraudulent it is not necessary that the
maker know the matter is not as represented. . . . It is enough that being
conscious that he has neither knowledge nor belief in the existence of the
matter he chooses to assert it as a fact.”69
Despite what appears to be a fairly simple and workable distinction
between the two claims, courts have nonetheless confused them over and
over again.70 In fact, even leading national treatises on tort law pay little
heed to the difference between negligent and fraudulent
misrepresentation.71 Some legal commentators have struggled with the fact
that negligent misrepresentation and fraudulent misrepresentation both
the maker of the misrepresentation is sufficiently less to justify a narrower responsibility for
its consequences.”).
63. See Smith, supra note 52, at 185.
64. See id. at 185.
65. See Francis H. Bohlen, Should Negligent Misrepresentations Be Treated As
Negligence or Fraud?, 18 VA. L. REV. 703, 706 (1932) (“If negligent misrepresentation is
called fraud, and, therefore, comes to be regarded by courts as tantamount thereto, there is
danger that the unintentional character of the one and the intentional character of the other
will be overlooked.”).
66. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 526.
67. Lipner & Catalano, supra note 27, at 664 (citing Reno v. Bull, 124 N.E. 144, 145
(N.Y. 1919)).
68. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 526.
69. Id. § 526 cmt. e.
70. See, e.g., Wise & Poole, supra note 21, at 847 (“Unfortunately, the commentary on
negligent misrepresentation under Texas law is cursory, lumping negligent misrepresentation
with the discussions of fraud.”).
71. See id. at 846 n.2.
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require an evaluation of the misrepresentor’s state of mind, as he is “the
only one normally who can explain how he could have honestly made such
a mistake.”72 Thus, it is often difficult to differentiate the proof needed for
each respective claim.73
As such, courts have developed different notions of what kinds of actions
or misstatements should give rise to fraudulent misrepresentation, as
opposed to negligent misrepresentation.
Some cases are easy to
categorize—when the defendant makes a statement he believes to be false,
then a finding of fraudulent misrepresentation is obvious.74 But there is a
gray area where the defendant makes a statement in “conscious ignorance”
of the truth, but not necessarily with knowledge that his words are untrue,
especially given the difficulty in determining the requisite state of mind in a
given case.75 Thus, some courts follow the rule that “an unqualified
assertion of a fact susceptible of defendant’s knowledge is regarded as an
assertion of that knowledge, and if the defendant does not have it the
statement is fraudulent.”76 Naturally, these shades of gray also impugn the
very nature of the respective torts, blurring the line between negligence and
more malevolent intentions.
4. Differing State Policy Approaches to
Negligent Misrepresentation Claims
To that end, states have developed various policy stances on how
negligent misrepresentation claims ought to be treated and classified,
forming the basis for state-to-state differences in negligent
misrepresentation law.77 The main question driving the state policy
differences flows from the early intellectual and legal underpinnings of
misrepresentation law and negligence law78—is a claim for negligent
misrepresentation tantamount to an action of deceit, or is it so starkly
different from an intentional wrong that it must be treated more as an action
of negligence?79
In Falls Sand & Gravel Co. v. Western Concrete, Inc.,80 the District of
Montana addressed this question extensively in a particularly instructive

72. Page Keeton, Fraud: The Necessity for an Intent To Deceive, 5 UCLA L. REV. 583,
596 (1958).
73. Id. at 583–84.
74. See, e.g., Shackett v. Bickford, 65 A. 252, 252–54 (N.H. 1906) (holding that the
fraudulent character of a representation is established when the person making the
representation does not believe it to be true); Howard v. Gould, 28 Vt. 523 (1856) (same).
75. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 526 reporter’s note (1977).
76. See id.
77. This subsection of the Note will address the policy issues driving the debate among
states over the proper classification of negligent misrepresentation claims. For a more
detailed examination of state law variations in negligent misrepresentation law that have
developed in part as a result of these interpretative issues, see infra Part I.A.5.
78. See supra Part I.A.3.
79. See, e.g., Falls Sand & Gravel Co. v. W. Concrete, Inc., 270 F. Supp. 495, 501–02
(D. Mont. 1967).
80. Id.
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opinion arising out of a dispute between a sand supplier and concrete
contractor.81 In this case, the plaintiff contracted with the defendant to
supply sand for a building project, and the defendant provided the plaintiff
with production schedules and amounts of sand required at various intervals
throughout that schedule.82 As it turned out, the defendant negligently
misrepresented the schedule to the plaintiff, and the resulting deviations led
to sporadic operations and increased the attendant costs to the plaintiff by
over $100,000.83
The plaintiff brought an action against the defendant for several counts of
negligent misrepresentation, but interestingly, the defendant argued as one
of its defenses that the two-year statute of limitations for a claim for fraud
had expired.84 The court then conducted an inquiry into whether an action
for negligent misrepresentation should essentially be deemed an action for
fraud, ultimately holding that it should, meaning that a two-year statute of
limitations would apply.85
In reaching this conclusion, the court framed its opinion by
acknowledging that negligent misrepresentation “is quite different from an
action for intentional fraudulent and deceitful misrepresentation, since there
is no requirement of scienter.”86 However, the court noted that “as the law
of this tort developed, the courts of the United States have frequently
extended the action of deceit into that of negligent misrepresentation” by
presuming the existence of an intent to deceive.87
Ultimately, the opinion reflected a belief held by several states that there
can be different grades of severity of negligent misrepresentation. The
court emphasized that even Justice Cardozo’s opinion in Ultramares88
provided recovery for the plaintiff primarily on grounds of deceit, not strict
negligence, because the negligence was “so great that it amounted to
scienter.”89 This conception of negligent misrepresentation as a subset of
fraud remains alive and well in some states today.90
Conversely, many states and legal commentators refuse to extend fraud
and actions for deceit to cover negligent misrepresentation claims.91 Even
the opinion in Falls Sand acknowledged that the Restatement, Prosser and
81. Id. at 498.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 501–02.
85. Id. at 501–05.
86. Id. at 501.
87. Id. at 502.
88. For a related discussion, see supra Part I.A.2.
89. Falls Sand, 270 F. Supp. at 502.
90. See Oakland Raiders v. Oakland-Alameda Cnty. Coliseum, 51 Cal. Rptr. 3d 144, 149
(Ct. App. 2006) (holding that the word “fraud” can be used to describe certain negligent
misrepresentations); Sheets v. Brethren Mut. Ins. Co., 679 A.2d 540, 553 (Md. 1996);
Bourgois v. Montana-Dakota Utils. Co., 466 N.W.2d 813, 818 (N.D. 1991).
91. See, e.g., Bhandari v. VHA Sw. Cmty. Health Corp., No. CIV 09-0932 JB/GBW,
2011 WL 1336512, at *15–17 (D.N.M. Mar. 30, 2011) (collecting cases distinguishing
negligent misrepresentation from fraud and deceit); see also Tex. Tunneling Co. v. City of
Chattanooga, 329 F.2d 402, 410 (6th Cir. 1964); Falls Sand, 270 F. Supp. at 502.
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Keeton on Torts, and a wide band of case law support the opposite position
from the one that the Falls Sand court adopted.92 Thus, courts have
differing views about the character of negligent misrepresentation,
influencing their legal treatment of negligent misrepresentation claims.
5. State Law Variations in Negligent Misrepresentation
These differing concepts of negligent misrepresentation can affect what a
plaintiff is required to show when pleading negligent misrepresentation in a
given state. For example, an examination of the law in Florida is instructive
because the elements of negligent misrepresentation track a fraud- and
deceit-based conception of the tort:
In Florida, plaintiffs may establish negligent misrepresentation by proving
“(1) [a] misrepresentation of a material fact; (2) the representor . . .
ma[d]e the representation without knowledge as to its truth or falsity, or
. . . under circumstances in which he ought to have known of its falsity;
(3) the representor . . . intend[ed] that the misrepresentation induce
another to act on it; (4) injury must result to the party acting in justifiable
reliance on the misrepresentation.”93

Florida’s highest court has long held that these elements make negligent
misrepresentation “tantamount to actionable fraud,”94 noting that because it
is an action “for deceit, [it] is necessarily founded in fraud, and, in order to
make out a case of fraud, as distinguished from inadvertence, mistake,
negligence, accident, and the like, it is necessary to allege and prove the
scienter,—the knowledge of defendant that his representations were
false.”95
Other courts have resisted this approach.96 New Mexico, for instance,
draws careful distinctions in its law between negligent misrepresentation
and fraud, noting, inter alia, that “fraudulent misrepresentation requires an
untrue statement, while negligent misrepresentation may involve a
statement that is ‘literally true’ but misleading.”97
Thus, elements of negligent misrepresentation and accompanying
standards of proof can vary across states, placing differing burdens on
plaintiffs when bringing negligent misrepresentation claims in court.

92. Falls Sand, 270 F. Supp. at 502 (identifying the conflict of authorities regarding the
relation of deceit to negligent misrepresentation claims).
93. Souran v. Travelers Ins. Co., 982 F.2d 1497, 1503 (11th Cir. 1993) (alterations in
original) (quoting Hoon v. Pate Constr. Co., 607 So. 2d 423, 427 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)
(per curiam)).
94. Ostreyko v. B. C. Morton Org., Inc., 310 So. 2d 316, 318 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
95. Watson v. Jones, 25 So. 678, 681–82 (Fla. 1899).
96. See, e.g., Goehring v. Chapman Univ., 17 Cal. Rptr. 3d 39, 47 (Ct. App. 2004) (“The
tort of negligent misrepresentation does not require scienter . . . .”).
97. Eckhardt v. Charter Hosp. of Albuquerque, Inc., 953 P.2d 722, 735 (N.M. 1997).
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B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and Notice Pleading
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are a set of rules applying to all
civil actions and proceedings in the U.S. district courts.98 Rule 8 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure describes the pleading requirements for
most claims in federal courts.99
One of the main goals of establishing the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure was to create a system of rules that was simpler and more litigant
friendly, in contrast to the formalism of the previous pleading rules, which
were especially regimented and formal and frequently prevented litigants
from having their day in court.100 This was the vision of Charles E. Clark,
dean of Yale Law School and later a Second Circuit judge, who served as
the reporter for the original Advisory Committee for the Federal Rules and
is considered to be their chief architect.101
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was designed to promote
the type of simplicity and increased accessibility to courts that Clark sought
to achieve.102 The rules of pleading in the context of Rule 8, according to
Clark, were “not the place to obtain particularization of the case.”103 To
that end, Rule 8 requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief.”104
The legal sufficiency of a complaint may be challenged by a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted.105 In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “a court must accept the
plaintiff’s allegations as true and construe the complaint liberally granting
the plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the
facts.”106
Clark thought that an important purpose of Rule 8 was to ensure that a
complaint would provide sufficient facts to guide a potential res judicata
determination, so as to know whether a final judgment had already been
rendered on a given matter.107 In essence, Clark believed that complaints

98. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
99. See id. R. 8.
100. See Charles E. Clark, Simplified Pleading, 27 IOWA L. REV. 272, 274 (1942) (“Strict
pleading produces a reaction, because people will not tolerate the denial of justice for
formalities only. That is the history we must always bear in mind as to common-law
pleading, as well as under some of the later misapplications of code pleading.”); see also
Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 987, 990–91 (2003)
(“[T]he Federal Rules are essentially a reform effort designed to ensure litigants have their
day in court.”).
101. Peter Julian, Comment, Charles E. Clark and Simple Pleading: Against a
“Formalism of Generality,” 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1179, 1180 (2010).
102. See id. at 1196.
103. Clark, supra note 100, at 287. While Rule 8 applies to most claims brought in
federal court, the pleading of “fraud or mistake” and “conditions of mind” are governed by a
heightened standard under Rule 9(b). See FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). For a detailed discussion of
Rule 9(b), see infra Part I.C.
104. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
105. See id. R. 12(b)(6).
106. Fairman, supra note 100, at 992.
107. Julian, supra note 101, at 1196.
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should give adequate notice to the court and the defendant of a plaintiff’s
claims by means of “very brief and direct allegation[s].”108 He did not
believe that pleadings were the proper place to provide evidence or proof—
a departure from past practice.109
This pleading regime became more complex after the Supreme Court’s
holding in the 1957 case Conley v. Gibson.110 In Conley, the plaintiffs, who
were African American railway workers, alleged that their union provided
them with inferior representation as compared to similarly situated white
workers.111 In response, the union defendants argued, inter alia, that the
plaintiffs’ complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted because it contained insufficient factual allegations to support their
general claims of discrimination.112
In evaluating that argument, the Supreme Court posited that sufficiency
of allegations contained in a complaint would follow “the accepted rule that
a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support
of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”113 The Supreme Court
justified this approach by pointing to Rule 8 and stressing that the
complaint need only contain “‘a short and plain statement of the claim’ that
will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.”114 Accordingly, the Court found that the
plaintiffs survived the 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss because their complaint
gave the defendants fair notice of the basis of their claim.115
The Conley holding set the trajectory for pleading in federal courts for
years to come, with its “no set of facts” language characterizing the modern
understanding of what came to be known as “notice pleading.”116 The very
term “notice pleading” had been rejected by Clark and the original drafters
of the Federal Rules, coming into style only after it was used by the
Supreme Court in Conley.117
This style of pleading, as set forth in Conley, failed to advance a number
of important values courts sought to protect.118 Courts generally use
procedure to promote adjudicative efficiency, fairness, and predictability,

108. Id. at 1197 (citing Charles E. Clark, Fundamental Changes Effected by the New
Federal Rules I, 15 TENN. L. REV. 551, 568 (1939)).
109. Id.
110. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
111. Id. at 43.
112. See id. at 43, 46–47.
113. Id. at 45–46 (emphasis added).
114. Id. at 47 (emphasis added) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)).
115. Id. at 48.
116. See Julian, supra note 101, at 1189 (“Conley’s ‘no set of facts’ language was
fundamental to the modern understanding of notice pleading, at least as it was expressed in
the rhetoric of the courts.”).
117. See id. at 1189. Courts had used the term very infrequently prior to Conley. Id. at
1190. After the Conley decision, courts’ use of the term increased exponentially. Id. For a
statistical evaluation of this increase, see Fairman, supra note 100, at 988 n.4.
118. See Julian, supra note 101, at 1182, 1191.
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among other values.119 By allowing such a generalized, liberal form of
pleading, courts found themselves with clogged dockets, and plaintiffs
found a lower initial barrier to entry than before.120 And many lower courts
that disagreed with the “notice pleading” mandate simply eschewed it for
their own, ad hoc heightened standards, especially in cases alleging a
defendant’s improper state of mind, making litigation highly
unpredictable.121
With lower courts subverting the Conley ruling, the Supreme Court
revisited pleading standards in 1993 in Leatherman v. Tarrant County
Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit.122 In this case, the district
court had imposed a heightened pleading standard for a civil rights claim—
exactly the type of claim that is generally easy to plead and potentially very
harmful to a defendant’s reputation, triggering policy concerns among
lower courts.123 The Supreme Court rejected the lower court’s approach,
holding that because civil rights claims were not expressly included in the
category of claims eligible for heightened pleading standards under Federal
Rule 9(b), Rule 8 applied.124
Even after Leatherman, though, lower courts persisted in applying
heightened pleading standards.125 This led the Supreme Court to address
the issue again in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A.,126 attempting to restore
order to the district courts and bring them in line with Conley notice
pleading.127 In this employment discrimination action, the Court reinforced
its holding in Leatherman.128
Nonetheless, the pattern of ignoring notice pleading at the district court
level continued, with courts becoming increasingly concerned about
protecting defendants’ reputations, trimming ever-expanding dockets, and
addressing increasingly expensive discovery costs as a result of electronic
discovery.129
As evidenced by Leatherman and Swierkiewicz, certain types of claims—
especially easy-to-plead claims with significant reputational implications
like fraud and civil rights violations—required greater factual specificity in
order to preserve these fairness- and efficiency-based values.130 This
practice threatened the transsubstantive nature of Rule 8.131 As different
119. See id. at 1182.
120. See id. at 1192.
121. See id. at 1191 (“[L]ower courts [paid] lip service to the rhetoric of notice pleading
while actually imposing heightened pleading standards.”).
122. 507 U.S. 163 (1993).
123. See id. at 165.
124. Id. at 168.
125. See Julian, supra note 101, at 1190.
126. 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
127. See id. at 514.
128. Id. at 512–13.
129. See Julian, supra note 101, at 1192–93, 1210.
130. See id. at 1192–93.
131. See Fairman, supra note 100, at 1037–38. Transsubstantivity is essentially “the
notion that the same procedural rules should be available for all civil law suits:
(1) regardless of the substantive law underlying the claims, or “case-type” transsubstantivity;
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styles of pleading continued to pervade the district courts, it became
appropriate to question not only the force of Rule 8, but even the place of
Rule 9(b) as well.
C. Rule 9(b): The Heightened Federal Pleading Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) requires plaintiffs to plead claims of
fraud or mistake with particularity.132 As courts typically look to the
“circumstances constituting fraud,”133 factors such as “time, place, contents
of the false representation, the person making it, and what was obtained
from it must be stated with specificity.”134 This is a sensible formulation
for affirmative misrepresentations because they “are discrete, observable
events which can be particularized.”135 Just because a claim is not
technically referred to as “fraud” does not mean it is automatically exempt
from the heightened standard.136
Interestingly, Clark never thought that Rule 9(b) was very significant; he
assumed that courts had the discretion to adjust pleading standards as they
saw fit on a case-by-case basis.137 In the congressional hearings on the
Federal Rules at the time of their inception—and in related American Bar
Association proceedings—Rule 9(b) was barely discussed.138
Rule 9(b) was initially drawn from Rule 22 of the English Practice Rules,
which allowed for knowledge to be alleged in general terms, without an
explanation of the surrounding circumstances.139 However, while the plain
language of Rule 9(b) and its origins do not seem entirely stringent, courts
have, over time, applied an even more heightened version of the standard,
with the Second Circuit requiring plaintiffs to plead facts giving rise to a
“strong inference of scienter.”140 Other circuits have recognized that
plaintiffs may generally allege scienter merely by stating its existence.141
and (2) regardless of the size of the litigation or the stakes involved, or case-size
transsubstantivity.” Stephen N. Subrin, The Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure: An
Essay on Adjusting the “One Size Fits All” Assumption, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 377, 378
(2010).
132. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (“In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with
particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge, and
other conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged generally.”).
133. Id.
134. Fairman, supra note 100, at 1004.
135. Breeden v. Richmond Cmty. Coll., 171 F.R.D. 189, 195 (M.D.N.C. 1997) (“An
affirmative misrepresentation involves a specific statement made at a specific place and time
and involves specific persons.”).
136. See Fairman, supra note 100, at 1005 (“[I]f the claim is ‘fraud-like,’ specificity is
required.”).
137. See Clark, supra note 100, at 274. Clark argued that the rule was not important
because it “probably state[d] only what courts would do anyhow and may not be considered
absolutely essential.” Id.
138. William E. Richman, Donald E. Lively & Patricia Mell, The Pleading of Fraud:
Rhymes Without Reason, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 959, 965 (1987).
139. Daniel L. Brockett & Jeremy D. Andersen, Pleading Common Law Fraud in the
Second Circuit, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 27, 2012, at A4.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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It is important to note that cases of securities fraud automatically adhere
to a separate, heightened standard as a result of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995142 (PLSRA)—the standard is similar to that
of Rule 9(b).143 Congress adopted the Second Circuit’s version of this
standard—considered to be the most stringent—for applicable securities
fraud claims.144 Significantly, Congress also required that the Rule 9(b)
standard be applied to claims of misrepresentation in the same context.145
While this Note addresses only common law claims of
misrepresentation—not those in the securities fraud context falling under
the PSLRA—it is important to understand how the PSLRA standard may
have leaked into common law pleading standard jurisprudence.146 As
courts have decided more and more cases under the PSLRA, which
essentially adopted the toughest version of Rule 9(b)’s standard, common
law fraud claims across circuits have been increasingly held to a similar
standard.147
D. Putting Conley to Bed: A New Pleading Regime
Under Twombly and Iqbal
As lower courts continued to reject Conley and its progeny when
choosing which pleading standard to apply, the Supreme Court ultimately
decided to abandon Conley for good. This subsection examines a pair of
Supreme Court cases that collectively heightened the pleading requirement
under Rule 8 and established a new pleading standard regime.
1. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
Not even Swierkiewicz could put an end to lower courts’ subversion of
Conley’s notice-pleading pronouncement.148 Accordingly, just four years
after its decision in Swierkiewicz, the Supreme Court revisited the Rule 8
pleading standard yet again in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly.149 The case
would come to signify a major shift in the Rule 8 standard, effectively
retiring Conley-style notice pleading.150

142. Pub. L. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
15 U.S.C.).
143. See Evan Hill, Note, The Rule 10b-5 Suit: Loss Causation Pleading Standards in
Private Securities Fraud Claims After Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 78 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2659, 2672 (2010).
144. See id.
145. See id. at 2672–73 (citing S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 15 (1995), reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 694).
146. See Brockett & Andersen, supra note 139.
147. See id.
148. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
149. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
150. See A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 432, 432 (2008)
(“Although the Court’s move in this direction is consistent with long-held sentiment among
the lower federal courts, the Twombly decision represents a break from the Court’s previous
embrace of notice pleading.”).
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In Twombly, customers of local internet and telephone companies
brought a putative class action suit against these companies alleging, inter
alia, antitrust violations.151 At bottom, plaintiffs claimed that larger local
telephone companies conspired to restrict smaller carriers’ access to their
local markets, which effectively drove down competition locally, and the
companies also agreed not to compete with one another, which enabled
them to charge artificially high prices for their services.152
Writing for the majority, Justice David H. Souter emphasized that in
order for the plaintiffs’ claim to survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the
plaintiffs would need to provide evidence in their complaint that
demonstrated that the defendant telephone companies did not act
independently.153 The Court then, citing to Conley, explained that while
Rule 8(a)(2) only requires a short and plain statement that gives a defendant
fair notice of the claims, a “plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of
his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”154
The Court then went on to depart from notice pleading even further,
asserting that the facts pled must be sufficient to “raise a right to relief
above the speculative level . . . on the assumption that all the allegations in
the complaint are true.”155 The Court reasoned that requiring the complaint
to state “plausible grounds to infer an agreement [among the defendant
telephone companies] does not impose a probability requirement at the
pleading stage; it simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal agreement.”156
Thus, in the context of the complaint in Twombly, the Court held that
while the underlying allegations regarding an agreement among the
defendant telephone companies were almost sufficient to state a claim,
“without some further factual enhancement it stops short of the line between
possibility and plausibility of ‘entitle[ment] to relief.’”157
Furthermore, the Court disposed of the plaintiffs’ argument that a
common reading of Conley and its “no set of facts” language precluded the
application of this higher, plausibility-based standard.158 In essence, the
Court claimed that the Conley language had been widely misinterpreted
over the years and could conceivably permit a “wholly conclusory” claim to
survive a 12(b)(6) challenge where the pleading left open the chance of
establishing some set of facts which at a later time might establish grounds

151. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 550–51.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 554.
154. Id. at 555.
155. Id. at 555 (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 n.1 (2002)). To
this end, the court noted that Rule 8 required some “showing” of “entitlement to relief.” Id.
at 555 n.3.
156. Id. at 556 (emphasis added).
157. Id. at 557 (alteration in original) (emphasis added).
158. Id. at 560–61.
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for recovery.159 Therefore, with respect to the “no set of facts” language,
the Court declared that “this famous observation has earned its
retirement.”160
Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion in Twombly,
observing that the high costs of discovery in an antitrust suit such as the one
at bar—as well as the generally increasing costs of discovery because of
electronic documents—implicitly drove the majority’s decision to heighten
the pleading standard.161 Justice Stevens believed that the answer to this
potential problem was not a plausibility standard, but “careful case
management, including strict control of discovery, careful scrutiny of
evidence at the summary judgment stage, and lucid instructions to
juries.”162 In addition, Justice Stevens felt that Rule 8, as codified in the
Federal Rules, “does not require, or even invite, the pleading of facts,”
noting that Conley remained good law despite the majority’s interpretation
of it.163
The Court’s decision in Twombly left many questions unanswered and
raised questions regarding transsubstantivity in the process—should this
pleading standard apply only to antitrust claims and the like, or to all
claims? Justice Stevens reflected on this question in his Twombly dissent,
wondering “[w]hether the Court’s actions will benefit only defendants in
antitrust treble-damages cases, or whether its test for the sufficiency of a
complaint w[ould] inure to the benefit of all civil defendants.”164
2. Ashcroft v. Iqbal
The Supreme Court answered those questions two years later when it
revisited the Rule 8 standard once more in Ashcroft v. Iqbal.165 Iqbal
involved an entirely different set of claims from those in Twombly—in
Iqbal, an individual arrested on immigration charges sued former Attorney
General John Ashcroft and Robert Mueller, director of the FBI, among
others, for violations of his First and Fifth Amendment rights because of
mistreatment while in detention.166
Writing for the majority, Justice Anthony Kennedy reaffirmed the
Court’s holding in Twombly that Rule 8(a)(2) requires a complaint to
contain enough allegations such that relief would be plausible.167 However,
the Court expanded on the holding in Twombly, specifically highlighting
two “working principles”168 at the core of the Twombly decision: (1) in

159. Id. at 561; see also Spencer, supra note 150, at 447 (describing the inconsistency
between Twombly plausibility pleading and Conley’s “no set of facts” language).
160. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563.
161. See id. at 572–73 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 573.
163. See id. at 580.
164. Id. at 596.
165. 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
166. Id. at 667–68.
167. See id. at 677–78.
168. Id. at 678.
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deciding a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court must accept the factual
allegations of a complaint as true, but not conclusory allegations that track
the relevant legal standard, and (2) only a complaint containing a plausible
claim for relief can survive a motion to dismiss.169 Accordingly, a court
must conduct a two-step inquiry when reviewing a complaint challenged
under 12(b)(6), first identifying which claims do not deserve to be accepted
as true because they are factually unsupported and are “no more than
conclusions,”170 and then deciding whether the remaining allegations can
plausibly support entitlement to relief.171
In applying this analysis to Iqbal’s claims, the Court found that the
factual allegations pled did not give rise to a plausible inference that Iqbal
was entitled to relief, primarily because there were other “more likely”
explanations for Iqbal’s alleged mistreatment than those that he pleaded.172
Even more important, however, the Court clearly stated that Twombly
reached beyond the context of antitrust cases: “[Twombly] was based on
our interpretation and application of Rule 8 . . . [which] governs the
pleading standard ‘in all civil actions and proceedings . . . .’ Our decision
in Twombly expounded the pleading standard for ‘all civil actions,’ and it
applies to antitrust and discrimination suits alike.”173
The Court also pushed back on Iqbal’s argument that Rule 9(b)’s
statement that “conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged generally”174
permitted him to allege generally the discriminatory intent underlying his
claims for relief.175 Specifically, the Court noted that “generally” is a
“relative term,” which “in the context of Rule 9” is to be “compared to the
particularity requirement applicable to fraud or mistake.”176
Justice Souter wrote a dissenting opinion, disagreeing with the notion
that allegations in a complaint do not deserve to be automatically accepted
as true: “Twombly does not require a court at the motion-to-dismiss stage to
consider whether the factual allegations are probably true. We made it
clear, on the contrary, that a court must take the allegations as true, no
matter how skeptical the court may be.”177

169. See id. at 678–79; see also Anthony Gambol, Note, The Twombly Standard and
Affirmative Defenses: What Is Good for the Goose Is Not Always Good for the Gander, 79
FORDHAM L. REV. 2173, 2188 (2011).
170. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 680.
173. Id. at 684 (citation omitted) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1).
174. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (emphasis added).
175. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 687 (“Rule 8 does not empower respondent to plead the bare
elements of his cause of action, affix the label ‘general allegation,’ and expect his complaint
to survive a motion to dismiss.”).
176. Id. at 686–87 (“Rule 9 merely excuses a party from pleading discriminatory intent
under an elevated pleading standard. It does not give him license to evade the less rigid—
though still operative—strictures of Rule 8.”).
177. Id. at 696 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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3. Reconciling Rule 9(b) with Rule 8(a)(2) After Twombly and Iqbal
In order to understand the interplay between Rule 9(b) and Rule 8(a) in
the context of negligent misrepresentation claims, it is necessary to examine
the potential impact that the revised Rule 8 standard has on the operation of
Rule 9.
In many ways, Twombly and Iqbal have seemingly blurred the line
between Rule 8(a)(2) and 9(b), or, at minimum, produced inconsistencies
among the rules. To the former point, the Twombly rule that the complaint
must include factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above
the speculative level” seems similar to a particularity requirement.178 To
the latter point, Rule 9(b)’s language about averring conditions of the mind
“generally” refers to the traditional Rule 8(a)(2) pleading standard—the
very standard that Twombly raises.179
While it may still be too early to discern how the rules in the post–
Twombly and Iqbal era will work in conjunction with each other in practice,
there are reasons to believe that the distinction remains meaningful.180
Twombly specifically distinguished the new Rule 8 standard from Rule
9(b):
In reaching this conclusion, we do not apply any “heightened” pleading
standard, nor do we seek to broaden the scope of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 9, which can only be accomplished “by the process of
amending the Federal Rules, and not by judicial interpretation.” On
certain subjects understood to raise a high risk of abusive litigation, a
plaintiff must state factual allegations with greater particularity than Rule
8 requires. Here, our concern is not that the allegations in the complaint
were insufficiently “particular[ized],” rather, the complaint warranted
dismissal because it failed in toto to render plaintiffs’ entitlement to relief
plausible.181

Only time will tell how this distinction actually plays out in the lower
courts, which have demonstrated—in the arena of pleading standards—a
pattern of ignoring Supreme Court precedent.

178. See Spencer, supra note 150, at 432 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007)).
179. See id. at 474 (“Any standard that requires ‘more than labels and conclusions’ and
explicitly calls for the pleading of suggestive facts supporting legal assertions such as the
existence of an unlawful agreement or conspiracy fails to permit matters to be averred
generally.”).
180. See Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 88 n.333 (2010) (“[I]n Starr v. Sony BMG
Music Entertainment, 592 F.3d 314 (2d Cir. 2010), the court suggested that facts related to
time, place, or the specific individuals involved are necessary to satisfy Rule 8 only if the
other factual allegations do not provide notice.”); see also Hollander v. Etymotic Research,
Inc., 726 F. Supp. 2d 543, 551 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (finding allegations might meet Rule 8
standards, but not Rule 9(b)).
181. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 569 n.14 (alteration in original) (quoting Swierkiewicz v.
Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002)). Thus, it would appear that there is an important
distinction to be made between particularized allegations and allegations that fail to support
a showing of plausible entitlement to relief.
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II. THE DIVIDE OVER THE PLEADING STANDARD FOR NEGLIGENT
MISREPRESENTATION CLAIMS
Federal courts have not reached a consensus on which pleading standard,
Rule 8(a) or 9(b), should apply to negligent misrepresentation claims. The
issue of pleading negligent misrepresentation splits not only circuit courts,
but district courts as well. There are various explanations, ranging from
state law differences to policy preferences to courts failing to apply recent
pleading standard precedent, for why the division and confusion among
courts has become so widespread. Because individual circuits have tended
not to be uniform in their approach to addressing pleading standards in the
context of negligent misrepresentation claims, it is not fair to call the
conflict at issue a true “circuit split.” Further, since no single factor alone is
responsible for the divergent approaches, it is difficult to identify the true
root of the conflict.
Thus, this Part of the Note explains how the conflict plays out in federal
courts by attempting to excavate the most important areas of contention
among the courts, and how this contributes to the divergent pleading
standard rationales. Since there is no clearly identifiable circuit split,
per se, but more accurately just confusion among courts, it will be more
productive to examine the engines of the conflict thematically as opposed to
geographically.
First, this Part will look at conflicting, pre-Twombly policy approaches to
interpreting Federal Rules 8 and 9 in the context of negligent
misrepresentation claims. It is vital to look at pre-Twombly approaches in
depth because they still persist to a lesser, but significant, degree today.182
Some courts, before and after Twombly, have embraced a broader,
expanded role for Rule 9(b) in pleadings and have chosen to apply that
standard to claims of negligent misrepresentation.183 On the other hand,
some pre-Twombly courts, relying on the lenient constructs of
transsubstantive notice pleading and a policy of lowering the bar for
specificity in pleadings, had found Rule 8(a) to be the proper pleading
standard for negligent misrepresentation.184
The Part also examines how Twombly and Iqbal have impacted these
policy approaches, with some courts using the framework of the new
plausibility standard under Rule 8 to evaluate negligent misrepresentation
claims.185
Next, this Part evaluates how state law differences in negligent
misrepresentation law affect the pleading standards courts apply when
sitting in diversity. Some states view negligent misrepresentation as
tantamount to fraud or mistake, leading courts to apply the Rule 9(b)
standard.186 Other states treat negligent misrepresentation more as a claim
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

See infra Part II.A.4.
See infra Part II.A.1.
See infra Part II.A.2.
See infra Part II.A.3.
See infra Part II.B.

2013]

9(B) OR NOT 9(B)?

1469

of pure negligence than as a claim sounding in fraud or mistake, prompting
federal courts applying the laws of those states to apply the Rule 8(a)
pleading standard.187
The final factor influencing the debate is an obvious one that flows from
state law differences: the ability of litigants to differentiate between claims
of negligent misrepresentation and claims of fraud in their pleadings, so as
to determine whether the former claims can stand on their own or are
merely redundant claims of fraud, which require a Rule 9(b) pleading
standard.188
A. Differing Policy Approaches to Pleading Negligent
Misrepresentation Before Twombly
Differing policy considerations and emphases led courts to different
conclusions regarding the proper pleading standard for negligent
misrepresentation claims before Twombly. These considerations still affect
some courts’ requirements for pleading negligent misrepresentation
today.189
Some courts, in applying Rule 9(b), have noted that negligent
misrepresentation claims deserve more careful scrutiny at the pleading stage
because they implicate serious reputational injury concerns.190 Other courts
dismiss this policy rationale as unimportant or untrue and instead have
applied Rule 8(a) as the pleading standard in the context of negligent
misrepresentation.191
Courts’ pre-Twombly preferences for how to evaluate the roles of Rules 8
and 9, respectively, also factor into the debate. Some courts envisioned
Rule 9(b) taking on a larger role in pleadings generally.192 Others
embraced a policy of transsubstantive notice pleading under Rule 8(a),
lowering the bar for pleading negligent misrepresentation.193
As noted above, while some of these pre-Twombly policy approaches
continue to influence decisions in applying 9(b) or 8(a) to negligent
misrepresentation claims today, some courts have started to adjust their
approaches to deciding which pleading standard to apply, forgoing a Rule
9(b) analysis and using the “plausibility” requirements of Rule 8(a) as a
guide.194
1. A Pre-Twombly Policy Favoring Rule 9(b)
Before Twombly, two major policy considerations regarding negligent
misrepresentation influenced courts to apply the heightened Rule 9(b)

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.A.4.
See infra Part II.A.1.
See infra Part II.A.2.
See infra Part II.A.1.
See infra Part II.A.2.
See infra Part II.A.3.
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standard to common law negligent misrepresentation claims. First, as the
Fifth Circuit posited in Williams v. WMX Technologies, Inc.,195 Rule 9(b)
generally deserved a larger role in pleading.196 This was especially true
because, as the Southern District of New York reinforced in Simon v.
Castello,197 negligent misrepresentation claims can seriously harm a
defendant’s reputation and thus deserve more initial scrutiny under the Rule
9(b) standard.198 Second, some courts treated negligent misrepresentation
claims under the umbrella of “mistake,” as enumerated in Rule 9(b).199
In Williams, the Fifth Circuit addressed the idea that Rule 9(b) should
take on a larger role in pleading generally.200 In the case, the plaintiffs,
former owners of a small sanitation company, sued WMX, a national
garbage hauling service.201 The plaintiffs sold their company for WMX
stock, claiming that they relied on misrepresentations by WMX that the
United States was running out of space to dispose of trash.202 Accordingly,
the plaintiffs brought claims of fraud and negligent misrepresentation, inter
alia, against WMX.203
In an opinion dismissing the claims for failing to meet the specificity
requirements of Rule 9(b), the Fifth Circuit declared that Rule 9(b)
“demands a larger role for pleading in the pre-trial defining of such
claims.”204 The court further stressed that the increased costs of pre-trial
discovery militate in favor of applying Rule 9(b) more rigorously.205
Although the Williams court did recognize that courts should give plaintiffs
“a fair opportunity to plead,”206 consistent with Rule 8(e)’s command that
“pleadings must be construed so as to do justice,”207 it still held that the
plaintiffs’ claims lacked the requisite specificity under 9(b) to withstand a
motion to dismiss, despite the relative length of their complaint.208 Critical
to the Fifth Circuit’s analysis in Williams was the nature of the fraud and
negligent misrepresentation claims and how close they were to “nonactionable expression[s] of opinion,” requiring that Rule 9(b) “take[] on
especial force.”209

195. 112 F.3d 175 (5th Cir. 1997).
196. See id. at 178.
197. 172 F.R.D. 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
198. Id. at 105.
199. See, e.g., Breeden v. Richmond Cmty. Coll., 171 F.R.D. 189, 199 (M.D.N.C. 1997).
200. See Williams, 112 F.3d at 178.
201. Id. at 176–77.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 177.
204. Id. at 178.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(e).
208. Williams, 112 F.3d at 178 (“A complaint can be long-winded, even prolix, without
pleading with particularity. Indeed, such a garrulous style is not an uncommon mask for an
absence of detail. The amended complaint here, although long, states little with
particularity.”).
209. Id.
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The impact that allegations of negligent misrepresentation can have on
one’s reputation led the Southern District of New York in Simon v.
Castello210 to require the Rule 9(b) pleading standard.211 In Simon, the
court recognized that some of the common policy considerations militating
in favor of applying Rule 9(b) to traditional fraud claims apply to negligent
misrepresentation claims as well.212
Some courts adopt Rule 9(b) because of the close similarity between
mistake and negligent misrepresentation.213 For instance, while there is no
controlling precedent in the Fourth Circuit,214 courts have pointed to several
factors favoring Rule 9(b). Most notably, because Rule 9(b) includes
mistake, the rule is not confined to willful misrepresentations and could
encompass negligently made ones.215
In Breeden v. Richmond Community College,216 the Middle District of
North Carolina (which sits in the Fourth Circuit) reasoned that a negligent
misrepresentation claim, “[l]ike a claim for fraud or mistake, . . . is based
upon some confusion or delusion of a party such as by some
misrepresentation, omission, misapprehension or misunderstanding.”217 In
its analysis, the court examined the history of Rule 9(b), explaining that
claims of “mistake” for reasons other than fraud and deceit have been
disfavored at common law.218
2. A Pre-Twombly Policy Approach Applying Rule 8(a)(2)
While some courts took an expansive view of Rule 9(b) with regard to
negligent misrepresentation claims, other courts insist that 9(b) ought to be
treated as an exception to the general rule of pleading—which is governed
by Rule 8(a)(2)—and, in the case of negligent misrepresentation, that this
exception ought not to apply.219 These diverging approaches appear even

210. 172 F.R.D. 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
211. See id. at 105.
212. See id.
213. See Breeden v. Richmond Cmty. Coll., 171 F.R.D. 189, 199 (M.D.N.C. 1997).
214. See Madison River Mgmt. Co. v. Bus. Mgmt. Software Corp., 351 F. Supp. 2d 436,
447 (M.D.N.C. 2005); Breeden, 171 F.R.D. at 199.
215. Breeden, 171 F.R.D. at 199 (“Rather, the rule was designed to govern claims
premised upon a party’s misrepresentation, misapprehension, or misunderstanding; in short,
arising out of either mutual or unilateral confusion, whether intentionally or carelessly
generated.”).
216. 171 F.R.D. at 189.
217. Id. at 202.
218. Id. at 201. Accordingly, the court held that Rule 9(b) should apply to negligent
misrepresentation claims. Id. at 202 (“In conclusion, from the rule’s historical foundations,
its text, and the nature of fraud and mistake actions, this Court finds that Rule 9(b) applies to
actions wherein the major component involves significant delusion or confusion of a party,
whether intentional or not.”).
219. See, e.g., Balt. Cnty. v. Cigna Healthcare, 238 F. App’x 914, 922 (4th Cir. 2007);
Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Posey, 415 F.3d 391, 396 (5th Cir. 2005); Am. Realty Trust, Inc.
v. Hamilton Lane Advisors, Inc., 115 F. App’x 662, 668–69 (5th Cir. 2004); HSA
Residential Mortg. Servs. of Tex. v. Casuccio, 350 F. Supp. 2d 352, 368 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
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within the same circuit, illuminating the conflict over the negligent
misrepresentation pleading standard.220
In American Realty Trust, Inc. v. Hamilton Lane Advisors, Inc.,221 a case
arising in the Fifth Circuit, a real estate company sued financial advisors for
negligently misrepresenting their ability to assist the company with a
refinancing project.222 The plaintiffs brought separate claims for fraud as
well, alleging that the defendants had made these misrepresentations to
induce them to enter into a separate consulting contract.223
In its decision, the Fifth Circuit was careful to distinguish between the
fraud claim and the negligent misrepresentation claim, taking a
substantially different view of the purpose of Rule 9(b) than it did in
Williams.224 The court specifically emphasized that Rule 9(b) is an
exception to the general pleading standard that must be applied
cautiously.225
Significantly, the court advanced this policy view of applying Rule 9(b)
sparingly in conjunction with espousing what it described as “liberal”226
Rule 8 pleading requirements. This policy approach to Rule 9(b), when
combined with a liberal attitude about pleading more in line with
Swierkiewicz than with the courts that defied notice pleading, leads to a
different result in evaluating how negligent misrepresentation claims are
pleaded.
The American Realty complaint did include separate counts for fraud and
negligent misrepresentation, but the latter count contained little substance to
set it apart from the fraud claim.227 Still, the court found it to be
sufficiently detailed to survive under Rule 8(a)(2), while dismissing the
fraud counts under Rule 9(b).228
Taking such an approach is significant when the plaintiff fails or is
unable to make allegations of negligent misrepresentation with the level of
specificity required under Rule 9(b).229 In General Electric Capital Corp.
v. Posey,230 yet another Fifth Circuit case, a lender sued former directors
and officers of a medical services company, claiming that negligent
misrepresentations on financial statements induced the lender to make a bad
220. See, e.g., Am. Realty, 115 F. App’x at 662; Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 415 F.3d at
391.
221. 115 F. App’x at 662.
222. Id. at 663–64.
223. Id.
224. See id. at 668.
225. See id. (“Rule 9(b) is an exception to the liberal federal court pleading requirements
embodied in Rule 8(a). Rule 9(b)’s stringent pleading requirements should not be extended
to causes of actions not enumerated therein.” (footnotes omitted)).
226. Id.
227. See Amended Complaint at 9–10, Am. Realty, 115 F. App’x at 662 (No. 3:02-CV0641-G).
228. Am. Realty, 115 F. App’x at 668.
229. See Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Posey, 415 F.3d 391, 396 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding
that plaintiff’s complaint sufficiently pleaded negligent misrepresentation despite the fact
that “the allegations are devoid of much factual particularity”).
230. Id.
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loan to the company.231 At oral argument, one defendant insisted—and the
court did not disagree232—that the plaintiff never stated “any kind of detail
for us to be able to discern what facts are being alleged” regarding the
misrepresentations of the financial statements.233 Still, the court concluded
that “[u]nder the lenient standard of notice pleading, such a ‘short and plain
statement of the claim’ is sufficient” and allowed the negligent
misrepresentation claim to proceed.234
The Fifth Circuit is not the only court to manifest conflicting preTwombly precedents regarding the proper negligent misrepresentation
pleading standard; both the Fourth Circuit and the Eastern District of New
York have, in certain cases, aligned with the approach in American Realty
and General Electric.235
In Baltimore County v. Cigna Healthcare,236 the Fourth Circuit—which
itself is divided on the proper pleading standard for negligent
misrepresentation
claims—distinguished
fraud
from
negligent
misrepresentation on policy grounds, positing that the latter did not
implicate reputational injury concerns, thereby justifying the application of
Rule 8.237 The court explained, “To require that non-fraud allegations be
stated with particularity merely because they appear in a complaint
alongside fraud averments, however, serves no similar reputationpreserving function, and would impose a burden on plaintiffs not
contemplated by the notice pleading requirements of Rule 8(a).”238
This view directly clashes with the assertion in Simon v. Castello that
negligent misrepresentation claims bear heavily on one’s reputation.239 A
dissenting opinion in Cigna Healthcare highlighted this conflict, noting that
“negligent misrepresentation claims bear on the morality of defendant’s
conduct and his reputation going forward.”240

231. Id. at 393–94.
232. Id. at 397 (noting that the complaint contained “minimal factual particularity”).
233. Id.
234. Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)). It is very important to note, however, that this case
was decided before Twombly and Iqbal. While the “short and plain statement” language
remains present in Rule 8(a), Conley-style notice pleading, as the Fifth Circuit imagined it in
General Electric, has since been retired. Whether the allegations of the complaint in
General Electric would survive a motion to dismiss under a heightened Rule 8 standard
remains uncertain. For a thorough discussion on the impact of Twombly and Iqbal on notice
pleading, see supra Part I.D.
235. See Balt. Cnty. v. Cigna Healthcare, 238 F. App’x 914, 922 (4th Cir. 2007); HSA
Residential Mortg. Servs. of Tex. v. Casuccio, 350 F. Supp. 2d 352, 368 (E.D.N.Y. 2003); In
re LILCO Sec. Litig., 625 F. Supp. 1500, 1504 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
236. 238 F. App’x at 914.
237. Id. at 922.
238. Id. (quoting Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2003)).
239. See Simon v. Castello, 172 F.R.D. 103, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). Of course, because all
of these cases were decided before Twombly, the courts were following then-current
precedents, which, depending on the case, may or may not conflict with the Twombly
holding.
240. Cigna Healthcare, 238 F. App’x at 925 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting); see also William
D. Bolling III, Comment, Denver Health & Hospital Authority v. Beverage Distributors Co.:
An Illustration of Converging Pleading Doctrines, 36 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 369, 390 (2012)
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In fact, six years before Simon v. Castello was decided, the Eastern
District of New York (which sits in the Second Circuit) in HSA Residential
Mortgage Services of Texas v. Casuccio,241 reflected the tone of General
Electric and embraced a liberal, notice-pleading approach to negligent
misrepresentation claims.242 In that case, the court cited Swierkiewicz243
and Conley244 to hold that the plaintiff “need only give fair notice of the
negligent misrepresentation claim and the grounds upon which it rests.”245
3. A Post-Twombly Policy Adjustment
In light of the Twombly decision, courts across several circuits have
started to reevaluate their previous policy rationales regarding the pleading
standard for negligent misrepresentation claims, ultimately settling on Rule
8(a)(2) and forgoing a Rule 9(b) analysis because of the higher bar now
imposed by the generalized standard.246
This trend is particularly notable within the Fifth Circuit, which had
previously been fractured over the proper pleading standard for negligent
misrepresentation claims.247 In Williams v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A.,248 the
Northern District of Texas was presented with negligent misrepresentation
and breach of contract claims stemming from the defendant bank’s alleged
misrepresentation of the language it used to characterize a sale of property
to the plaintiffs in the defendant’s report to a credit bureau.249
In granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss, the court applied the Rule
8(a)(2) plausibility standard under Twombly and reasoned that the plaintiffs
only recited the elements of the cause of action for negligent
misrepresentation in their complaint and did not allege enough facts,
showing that the defendant “failed to exercise reasonable care in
communicating the information in the agreement [regarding the reporting of
the property sale].”250
(discussing implications of Cigna Healthcare and the policy rationale underlying the
application of Rule 8(a) to negligent misrepresentation claims).
241. 350 F. Supp. 2d 352 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
242. See id. at 368–69.
243. 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
244. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
245. See HSA Residential, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 368 (citing Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512–
13).
246. See, e.g., Williams v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A., No. 4:12-CV-602-A, 2012 WL
5510747, at *1–2 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 14, 2012); Blonski v. Rogers, No. Civ. 2:12-01083 WBS
DAD, 2012 WL 5289325, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2012); Massey v. JPMorgan Chase Bank,
N.A., No. 4:12-CV-154-A, 2012 WL 3743493, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 29, 2012); Gonzalez v.
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., Civil Action No. 3:07-cv-00902 (FLW), 2009 WL 5216984, at *4
(D.N.J. Dec. 30, 2009); City of Raton v. Ark. River Power Auth., 600 F. Supp. 2d 1130,
1153 (D.N.M. 2008); see also Bolling, supra note 240, at 388–91 (tracing the trend of courts
incorporating Twombly into their negligent misrepresentation pleading standard
jurisprudence).
247. See supra Part II.A.1–2.
248. 2012 WL 5510747, at *1.
249. Id. at *1. This misrepresentation ultimately hindered the plaintiffs’ ability to
refinance at low rates and jeopardized their ability to retain the purchased property. Id.
250. Id. at *2.
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In particular, the court cited both Twombly and Iqbal to set forth the
misrepresentation pleading standard and support its conclusion that
negligent misrepresentation should be pleaded in accordance with the postTwombly plausibility standard under Rule 8(a)(2): “Although a complaint
need not contain detailed factual allegations, the ‘showing’ contemplated by
Rule 8 requires the plaintiff to do more than simply allege legal conclusions
or recite the elements of a cause of action.”251
The approach taken by the court in Wells Fargo could represent an
emerging trend among Texas district courts to treat negligent
misrepresentation claims under the general Rule 8 pleading standard, but to
require a greater level of specificity than has traditionally been required
under Rule 8 in light of Twombly and Iqbal.252
This development is not unique to district courts within the Fifth Circuit.
The District of New Mexico first recognized this shift just a year after
Twombly was decided, citing the elevated pleading standard as additional
support for applying Rule 8 instead of Rule 9(b) to claims of negligent
misrepresentation.253
[T]he Supreme Court has recently made the standards for dismissal under
rule 12(b)(6) more rigorous. Notice pleading under [Twombly] has real
teeth. There is no sound reason to give corporate defendants accused of
negligent misrepresentation more protection that [sic] doctors accused of
malpractice or automobile operators of negligence. Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly serves the purposes of pleading negligent misrepresentation as
well as would rule 9(b). Indeed, the Twombly rule is better, because there
is nothing served by creating a new exception to Twombly’s general rule
for a negligence tort unless there is some compelling reason to do so.254

More recently, a court in the District of New Jersey confronted the
negligent misrepresentation pleading standard in light of both Twombly and
Iqbal when it granted a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for
negligent misrepresentation under New York law stemming from the
development, labeling, and marketing of the drug Plavix.255 In that case,
Gonzalez v. Bristol-Myers Squibb, the defendants sought dismissal of the
plaintiff’s negligent misrepresentation claim because it allegedly failed to
satisfy the requirements of Rule 9(b).256 The plaintiff countered that Rule 8
was the proper standard for pleading negligent misrepresentation claims.257
251. Id. at *1.
252. See Massey v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 4:12-CV-154-A, 2012 WL
3743493, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 29, 2012) (holding that a negligent misrepresentation claim
did not survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss because it failed to meet “the standard set forth
in Rule 8(a)(2), as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Twombly and Iqbal”); Maisa Prop.,
Inc. v. Cathay Bank, No. 4:12-CV-066-A, 2012 WL 1563938, at *3 (N.D. Tex. May 2,
2012) (same).
253. See City of Raton v. Ark. River Power Auth., 600 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1144 (D.N.M.
2008).
254. See id.
255. See Gonzalez v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., Civil Action No. 3:07-cv-00902 (FLW),
2009 WL 5216984, at *6–8 (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 2009).
256. See id. at *5.
257. See id.
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The court’s opinion first addressed the question by pointing out that the
“inapplicability of Rule 9(b) to negligent misrepresentation claims . . . is not
as settled as Plaintiff suggest[ed].”258 However, the court decided to cut the
plaintiff off not with Rule 9(b), but with Rule 8.259 The court noted that the
complaint lacked any allegations regarding the specifics of the
misrepresentations that the plaintiff relied on and did not address which
misrepresentations he relied on in choosing to take Plavix.260
Recently, the Eastern District of California took a similar approach,
where the court dismissed the defendants’ counterclaim of negligent
misrepresentation because, “[r]egardless of whether negligent
misrepresentation claims are governed by the pleading standards of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 8 or the heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b),
in light of Iqbal and Twombly, the court finds defendant’s allegations
insufficient to state claims for either negligent or intentional
misrepresentation.”261 Thus, the court effectively refused to resolve
directly whether the pleading standard should be governed by Rule 8(a)(2)
or 9(b), because if a plaintiff cannot satisfy the former, he most certainly
cannot satisfy the latter.
4. Failing To Apply New Precedent to the Pleading Standard Analysis
Even in the face of the emerging trend in various districts and circuits to
resolve the negligent misrepresentation pleading standard quandary by
looking to the Supreme Court’s recent guidance in Twombly and Iqbal,
many courts have continued to apply pre-Twombly policy rationales in
choosing Rule 8(a)(2) or Rule 9(b).262
In that sense, disarray persists over what the proper pleading standard
should be, even within the same district. Within the Fifth Circuit, a court in
258. See id. The court cited an abundance of authority elucidating the debate and
emphasizing that courts are split. Id.
259. See id. at *6–8.
260. See id. at *8. The plaintiff had pointed to an allegation in his complaint that he
thought adequately satisfied the negligent misrepresentation element that he reasonably
relied on defendants’ misrepresentations to his detriment: “Defendants’ misrepresentations
were made to Plaintiff, as well as the general public. Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s healthcare
provider justifiably relied and acted upon Defendants’ misrepresentations and consequently,
Plaintiff’s ingestion of Plavix was to Plaintiff’s detriment.” Id. (internal citation omitted).
261. Blonski v. Rogers, No. Civ. 2:12-01083 WBS DAD, 2012 WL 5289325, at *2 (E.D.
Cal. Oct. 23, 2012).
262. See, e.g., Pacchiega v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 2:13-CV-478 JCM PAL, 2013
WL 3367576, at *2–3 (D. Nev. July 5, 2013) (applying Rule 9(b) to a negligent
misrepresentation claim, while applying Twombly’s Rule 8(a)(2) standard to another
common law claim); Kiper v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 884 F. Supp. 2d 561, 568–
69 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (citing pre-Twombly precedent in choosing Rule 9(b) as the negligent
misrepresentation pleading standard); Roubinek v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., No. 3:11–
CV–3481–D, 2012 WL 2358560, at *4 (N.D. Tex. June 21, 2012) (same); Proctor v. Metro.
Money Store Corp., 645 F. Supp. 2d 464, 473–76 (D. Md. 2009) (applying a liberal notice
pleading to a negligent misrepresentation claim); Apace Commc’ns, Ltd. v. Burke, 522 F.
Supp. 2d 509, 518–19 (W.D.N.Y. 2007) (using pre-Twombly case law as a rationale to apply
Rule 9(b) to a negligent misrepresentation claim, while applying Twombly’s Rule 8(a)(2)
standard to other common law claims).
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the Southern District of Texas decided to apply Rule 9(b) in Kiper v. BAC
Home Loans Servicing, LP.263 In Kiper, plaintiff sued a lender and
mortgage servicer for, inter alia, misrepresenting the status of plaintiff’s
request for a loan modification.264 In selecting Rule 9(b) as the proper
pleading standard for the negligent misrepresentation claim, the court cited
Williams v. WMX Technlologies, Inc.265—the 1997 Fifth Circuit opinion
espousing a broader role for Rule 9(b) in pleadings266—to support its
analysis.267
Districts in other circuits have conducted similar analyses in continuing
to apply Rule 9(b) to negligent misrepresentation claims in a post-Twombly
world, taking into account the policy factors, such as reputational
consequences, that courts urged in pre-Twombly case law. The District of
Nevada (which sits in the Ninth Circuit) took this approach in Pacchiega v.
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp.,268 recently applying Rule 9(b) to
negligent misrepresentation claims in a loan misrepresentation context
similar to Kiper.269 In choosing to apply Rule 9(b) to the negligent
misrepresentation claim, the court acknowledged the importance of
Twombly and the Rule 8(a)(2) plausibility standard, which the court
discussed extensively in emphasizing the Twombly plausibility standard.270
Even so, the court insisted on holding the negligent misrepresentation claim
to the Rule 9(b) standard while noting that one of the main purposes of that
rule is to protect against unfair reputational injury.271
In Apace Communications, Ltd. v. Burke,272 the Western District of New
York further evidenced a refusal to align the standard for pleading negligent
misrepresentation with the Twombly decision, citing a Second Circuit case
decided before Twombly to support the application of Rule 9(b).273 Like
the Northern District of Texas in Kiper, the Western District of New York
subjected other common law claims, including constructive fraud, “to the
‘plausibility’ requirement of Rule 8 as enunciated in Twombly.”274
On the other hand, some courts preferring a Rule 8(a)(2) pleading
standard for negligent misrepresentation claims appear to be giving these
claims less scrutiny than they deserve in light of Twombly’s plausibility
requirement. In 2009, more than two full years after Twombly, the District
of Maryland (which sits in the Fourth Circuit) cited Baltimore County v.
263. 884 F. Supp. 2d at 561. This approach contrasted with the Northern District of
Texas’s decision in Wells Fargo, which cited Twombly in support of applying the Rule
8(a)(2) pleading standard. See Williams v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 4:12-CV-602-A,
2012 WL 5510747, at *1–2 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 14, 2012).
264. Kiper, 884 F. Supp. 2d at 565–67.
265. 112 F.3d 175, 178 (5th Cir. 1997).
266. Id.
267. Kiper, 884 F. Supp. 2d at 569.
268. 2:13-CV-478 JCM PAL, 2013 WL 3367576, at *1–3 (D. Nev. July 5, 2013).
269. Id.
270. Id. at *1–2.
271. Id. at *2–3.
272. 522 F. Supp. 2d 509 (2007).
273. Id. at 518–19.
274. Id. at 520.
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Cigna Healthcare275 in support of applying a “liberal” standard of “‘notice
pleading’ under Rule 8(a)(2)” to a negligent misrepresentation claim.276
And, in contrast to the Western District of New York’s approach in Apace
Communications, a magistrate judge in the Eastern District of New York
recently cited HSA Residential—a 2003 Eastern District of New York
decision relying heavily on Conley and Swierkiewicz277—in considering the
appropriate pleading standard for a negligent misrepresentation claim in his
report and recommendation.278
B. The Impact of Differing State Legal Interpretations of Negligent
Misrepresentation on the Federal Pleading Standard
Differing state law interpretations and formulations of negligent
misrepresentation also influence the corresponding federal pleading
standard for cases heard in federal court under diversity jurisdiction. This
state law impact occurs because some states, such as Florida and Kentucky,
consider negligent misrepresentation to be tantamount, or nearly
tantamount, to actual fraud—which in federal court must be pleaded with
particularity.279 Other states, such as Illinois and New Mexico, treat
negligent misrepresentation as closer to a claim of pure negligence, which
would be governed by the Rule 8(a)(2) standard.280
For instance, the Southern District of Florida has gravitated towards Rule
9(b) for pleading negligent misrepresentation because the state law
elements of the claim sound in fraud.281 Under Florida law, the elements of
negligent misrepresentation make it “tantamount to actionable fraud.”282
The Florida Supreme Court noted that, because it is an action “for deceit,
[it] is necessarily founded in fraud, and, in order to make out a case of
fraud, as distinguished from inadvertence, mistake, negligence, accident,
and the like, it is necessary to allege and prove the scienter,—the
knowledge of defendant that his representations were false.”283

275. 238 F. App’x 914, 922 (4th Cir. 2007) (downplaying reputational injury in the
context of negligent misrepresentation).
276. Proctor v. Metro. Money Store Corp., 645 F. Supp. 2d 464, 476 (D. Md. 2009).
277. See HSA Residential Mortg. Servs. v. Casuccio, 350 F. Supp. 2d 352, 368 (E.D.N.Y.
2003).
278. See ADL, LLC v. Tirakian, No. CV 2006-5076(SJF)(MDG), 2010 WL 3925131, at
*8 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2010) (citing HSA Residential, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 368). The report
and recommendation did not specifically decide what the pleading standard should be.
279. See, e.g., Republic Bank & Trust Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 683 F.3d 239, 248 (6th
Cir. 2012); Pruco Life Ins. Co. v. Brasner, No. 10-80804-CIV, 2011 WL 2669651, at *4
(S.D. Fla. July 7, 2011).
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(D.N.M. 2008); Masso v. United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc., 884 F. Supp. 610, 615 (D. Mass.
1995).
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Co., 982 F.2d 1487, 1511 (11th Cir. 1993))).
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The Sixth Circuit took a similar approach when examining Kentucky
law.284 In a recent case, the court highlighted the duplicitous nature of one
element of a properly pleaded negligent misrepresentation claim under
Kentucky law, which requires a plaintiff to allege that the defendant
provided false information for the guidance of others in a transaction.285 As
a result, the court concluded that Kentucky’s negligent misrepresentation
law necessarily implicated various policy issues normally associated with
applying Rule 9(b), namely threat of reputational injury.286
Conversely, where a state’s laws recognize a more concrete dividing line
between negligent misrepresentation and fraud, federal courts applying that
state’s laws are more likely to allow Rule 8 to govern a negligent
misrepresentation claim.287
In Tricontinental Industries v.
PricewaterhouseCoopers,288 the Seventh Circuit used Illinois law to inform
its choice about the proper pleading standard for a claim by the plaintiff that
the defendant accounting firm negligently misrepresented the financial
worth of a client whose stock the plaintiff was considering purchasing.289
The court refused to apply Rule 9(b) to the claim, treating it more like
negligence than actual fraud, because Illinois law imposes a duty on
accounting firms, such as the defendant, to refrain from negligently or
carelessly making false statements on which third parties not in privity with
the defendant may foreseeably rely.290
Along the same lines, the District of New Mexico, in City of Raton v.
Arkansas River Power Authority,291 recently addressed the pleading
standard for negligent misrepresentation in light of New Mexico law, under
which there has been a longstanding and important distinction in state
courts between negligent misrepresentation and fraud- and deceit-style
claims.292 Specifically, the highest court in New Mexico has stated,
“Negligent misrepresentation is not, of course, a ‘lesser included’ cause of
action within a claim for deceit or fraud.”293 Thus, in contrast to the Florida
Supreme Court’s proclamation that negligent misrepresentation is
tantamount to fraud,294 the differing treatment of negligent
284. Republic Bank, 683 F.3d at 248.
285. Id. (“This element, plainly understood, requires an allegation of duplicity. Such an
allegation implicates Rule 9(b)’s ‘purpose[s] . . . to alert defendants as to the particulars of
their alleged misconduct so that they may respond. . . . [T]o [sic] prevent fishing
expeditions, to protect defendants’ reputations from allegations of fraud, and to narrow
potentially wide-ranging discovery to relevant matters.’” (alterations in original) (quoting
Chesbrough v. VPA, P.C., 655 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2011))).
286. Id.
287. See, e.g., Tricontinental Indus., Ltd. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 475 F.3d
824, 833 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that the necessary elements to make out a claim for
negligent misrepresentation in Illinois are such that Rule 9(b)’s heightened standard cannot
govern).
288. Id. at 824.
289. Id. at 828–29.
290. Id. at 833–34.
291. 600 F. Supp. 2d 1130 (D.N.M. 2008).
292. See id. at 1149.
293. Ledbetter v. Webb, 711 P.2d 874, 879 (N.M. 1985).
294. See supra note 283 and accompanying text.
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misrepresentation in New Mexico has led the District of New Mexico to
apply Rule 8(a)(2) to negligent misrepresentation claims, instead of the
heightened Rule 9(b) standard imposed for claims sounding in fraud.295
III. THE NEED TO ABANDON PRE-TWOMBLY PRECEDENTS
Thus, on a global level, there is an array of complex issues affecting the
way that federal courts evaluate and choose pleading standards for claims of
negligent misrepresentation, contributing to the courts’ general lack of
consistency on the subject.
However, there is one common theme linking everything together and
keeping the confusion alive: a high level of casualness among federal
courts in regard to federal pleading standards, a problem which is
compounded by inconsistencies in state law. As such, the pleading standard
for negligent misrepresentation remains in a state of chaotic disarray.
To be sure, Twombly and Iqbal are relatively new precedents, and it will
take time for federal courts to recognize how they apply to meaningfully
distinguish or merge Rules 8(a)(2) and 9(b).296 But, at least for the time
being, one thing is clear: while Twombly and Iqbal have influenced some
courts’ evaluation of negligent misrepresentation pleading standards,297
other courts persist in applying pre-Twombly precedent,298 rendering the
Supreme Court’s most recent pronouncements on pleading standards
ineffectual in the negligent misrepresentation context.
As a result, pre-Twombly precedent takes on even greater importance in
the discussion about negligent misrepresentation pleading standards. And
needless to say, that precedent is not well settled.299
But perhaps the most important problem causing differing and competing
approaches to negligent misrepresentation pleading standards is not
necessarily what the conflicts within the precedents are, but rather how the
courts have chosen to treat precedent in the first place. In order to better
track the development and pervasiveness of this theme, it is important to
start from Conley, not from Twombly.
One of Clark’s main goals in crafting the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure was to eliminate obstacles so that litigants could have their day
in court.300 He sought to break down the rigid formalism that characterized
the previous system of rules.301
In some respects, Conley was the realization of that vision, though
perhaps an extreme one. The “no set of facts” standard created a precedent
that sought to eliminate barriers to entry for litigants pursuing claims in
federal court.302 In the process, lower courts, though technically bound by
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.

See Ark. River, 600 F. Supp. 2d at 1142–44.
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the Supreme Court’s precedent, found that the standard was not appropriate
for certain types of claims, and so they routinely ignored the Conley
command, instead raising the Rule 8(a)(2) bar on a seemingly ad hoc
basis.303
The Supreme Court tried to address the lower courts’ casual disregard for
the Conley ruling in Leatherman, which proved only to be a failed attempt
at upholding the Conley version of notice pleading.304 Indeed, lower courts
continued to find ways around Leatherman, reflecting a special concern that
the ease with which a litigant could plead a claim under Conley threatened
to put a dent in the reputations—and the pocketbooks—of defendants who
potentially were not at any legal fault.305
The Supreme Court made one last attempt in Swierkiewicz to rein in the
lower courts and restore the Conley notice pleading standard.306 But those
efforts failed, as was plainly apparent by the Court’s revisiting and
“retiring” of Conley’s rendition of notice pleading four years later in
Twombly.307
This narrative of the lower courts’ persistently casual treatment of
Supreme Court pleading standard precedent helps to inform the
development and muddled state of the law as it relates to evaluating a
proper pleading standard for negligent misrepresentation.
Before Twombly, the level of specificity required in a complaint under
Rule 8(a)(2) was relatively low, making it easy for plaintiffs to bring claims
of negligent misrepresentation under that pleading standard.308 Even courts
that embraced the Rule 8(a)(2) standard referred to it as “liberal.”309
As such, it is no surprise that, without clear direction from the Supreme
Court—and with so many lower courts choosing not to follow its pleading
standard decisions anyway—some lower courts adopted a preference for
Rule 9(b).310 Purely as a matter of policy, some courts gravitated towards
Rule 9(b) for pleading negligent misrepresentation claims because Rule
8(a)(2) had no bite, making it too easy for plaintiffs to survive Rule
12(b)(6) motions to dismiss.311 And lower courts’ concerns over applying a
relatively weak pleading standard to negligent misrepresentation claims
were magnified because of the potential reputational implications these
claims can have on defendants.312 Finally, negligent misrepresentation on
its own—state law differences and interpretations aside—is an interesting
claim because it can conceivably be thought of as a type of “mistake” in the
Rule 9(b) sense, thereby requiring the Rule 9(b) standard to govern.313
303.
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Thus, to the extent that policy affects courts’ pleading standard calculus,
negligent misrepresentation claims may be conducive to a heightened
pleading standard.
The other important aspect of negligent misrepresentation, which is
heavily dictated by state law differences, is that the claim itself is not
always so different from a straightforward claim of fraud.314 The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure have specifically enumerated fraud as a claim to
be pleaded under the heightened Rule 9(b) pleading standard.315 States that
treat negligent misrepresentation as being tantamount to fraud then give
federal courts in those states good reason to apply the fraud pleading
standard to negligent misrepresentation claims.316
On the other hand, some states take the view that negligent
misrepresentation is closer to a claim of pure negligence.317 In that context,
it would make sense for a federal court to apply the general pleading
standard for negligence, which is unquestionably Rule 8(a)(2).318
Thus, given the variations in states’ formulations and interpretations of
negligent misrepresentation law, coupled with conflicting categorizations of
the claim at the federal level, it is naturally difficult for courts to agree on a
uniform standard for negligent misrepresentation claims.319
Where the substantive state law on negligent misrepresentation is clear,
the federal courts should be responsible for carrying it out, and applying an
appropriate pleading standard accordingly. Therefore, if a state law very
clearly treats negligent misrepresentation as being tantamount to fraud, then
the federal court should have a responsibility to apply Rule 9(b) to a
negligent misrepresentation claim. And, if a state obviously favors treating
negligent misrepresentation as closer to negligence, then Rule 8(a)(2) ought
to apply.
The problem is that state law is not always clear, and what’s more,
federal courts do not always apply it properly or treat it with an appropriate
level of care. In fact, in the context of negligent misrepresentation, a
Montana district court ignored lines of precedent and conflicting
interpretations of the state’s negligent misrepresentation law to bring the
tort closer to fraud.320 Further, as a policy matter, it is potentially
problematic for federal judges within the same district sitting in diversity to
apply different pleading standards to the same claim because of nebulous
state law variations.
Thus, while consulting and applying state law should theoretically be the
first step of federal courts in trying to decide which pleading standard
should govern a claim of negligent misrepresentation, in practice it is not
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clear that this strategy would work.321 And further, given how complex and
conflicted the law on negligent misrepresentation may be within a given
state, it is not always true that state law will draw a clear distinction about
whether negligent misrepresentation is closer to fraud or negligence.322 So,
in such a situation, what is a federal court to do?
Since Twombly, federal courts’ answer to that question has turned, rather
predictably, on the courts’ willingness, or lack thereof, to adhere to
pleading standard precedent.323 And while the Twombly and Iqbal
precedents are still young, there are preliminary indications that lower
courts are not following them in the negligent misrepresentation context.324
In light of Twombly, the need to have an expanded role for Rule 9(b), as
the Fifth Circuit urged in Williams, should no longer be too significant.325
Nonetheless, even after Twombly, the Northern District of Texas recently
cited the Williams opinion in applying Rule 9(b) to a claim of negligent
misrepresentation.
That courts are lagging behind in applying the proper precedent for
negligent misrepresentation claims is more alarming and dangerous than the
end result of selecting one standard over the other. The District of
Maryland, in selecting Rule 8(a)(2) as the standard to govern negligent
misrepresentation, cited case law discussing the liberal standard of notice
pleading under Rule 8(a)(2), as though the decision were being rendered in
the Conley era.326
This is the crux of the conflict and major reason for why federal courts
ought to be concerned.
One of the great difficulties, in light of the plausibility standard
announced in Twombly, in deciding whether to apply Rule 8 or 9(b) to
negligent misrepresentation claims, is that both standards have started to
converge.327 However, to the extent that the standards remain separate
from each other, with Rule 9(b) acting as a clearly heightened standard over
Rule 8(a)(2), Rule 8(a)(2) cannot easily become a panacea for the negligent
misrepresentation pleading problem given state law differences in the
treatment of negligent misrepresentation claims.328 Twombly has decidedly
not altered the original motivation for a heightened pleading standard for
fraud,329 so district courts in states that treat negligent misrepresentation as
tantamount to fraud would likely want to continue applying Rule 9(b) to
negligent misrepresentation claims, and rightfully so.
Thus, at bottom, the revised pleading standard under Rule 8(a)(2) should
not be the first resort for federal courts. First, it is important for courts to
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attempt to determine the thrust of state law and apply the appropriate
pleading standard accordingly. However, given the uncertainty surrounding
state law and the conflicting line of precedents both pre- and post-Twombly,
federal courts must rely on the revised general pleading standard under Rule
8(a)(2) as the default option when state law does not provide clear
guidance.330
The Twombly and Iqbal decisions militate against the old policy
justifications for elevating pleading standards for claims not clearly
sounding in fraud or mistake. Where state law does not dictate otherwise,
negligent misrepresentation does not deserve an elevated pleading standard:
the Supreme Court has already addressed concerns about possible threats to
a defendant’s reputation or high litigation expenses.331
In addition, courts treating negligent misrepresentation as a non-fraudbased, traditional common law claim have never provided rationale for why
pure claims of negligent misrepresentation ought to be viewed and pleaded
differently and more liberally than general common law claims. These
courts would not argue that negligent misrepresentation should be some sort
of exception, like fraud, to transsubstantive norms.332 As such, there is no
reason why negligent misrepresentation claims should not be subjected to a
less stringent pleading standard than any other typical common law claim.
Conley-style notice pleading for negligent misrepresentation is outdated and
should never be articulated as a rationale for applying Rule 8(a)(2) to
govern such claims.333
On the other hand, raising the bar uniformly to a Rule 9(b) standard
requiring particularity would extinguish negligent misrepresentation claims
as we know them, making them essentially tantamount to traditional fraud
claims. This policy is not a sound one, because there are subtle yet
important differences between negligent misrepresentation and fraud.334
Rule 9(b) is very much a special breed of pleading requirement, and it needs
to be cabined as such.
As it stands now, the PSLRA has influenced courts even in their
treatment of common law claims, notably fraud-based ones.335 Raising the
negligent misrepresentation standard uniformly to that set forth in Rule 9(b)
threatens to elevate the pleading standard beyond what should be
appropriate for a common law claim not purely rooted in fraud.
Therefore, the revised standard under Rule 8(a)(2) provides a good
compromise solution for federal courts when there is uncertainty over the
treatment of state law negligent misrepresentation claims.
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CONCLUSION
Lower federal courts have traditionally taken a casual approach to the
Supreme Court’s pronouncements on pleading standards. And they have
made no exception for claims of negligent misrepresentation. As such, the
pleading standard for negligent misrepresentation in federal courts remains
as murky as ever. In addition, state law variations in negligent
misrepresentation further prevent federal courts from adopting a universal
standard, or even from taking a consistent approach to evaluating which
standard to apply. Thus, to eliminate the confusion, to streamline pleading,
and to follow current precedent, federal courts must first do a better job of
attempting to discern state law on negligent misrepresentation. When the
law is unclear, the courts should not hesitate to apply Rule 8(a)(2) for
claims of negligent misrepresentation in light of Twombly and Iqbal, as the
revised pleading standard more comfortably fits these unique common law
claims.

